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IN THE S.UPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF U'TAH
RUTH NEIGHBORS ADAMS,
Plaintiff and Appellant7

No. 8141

-vs.FLORETTA LANG,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEJ\1ENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal fron1 a jury verdict and judgment
thereon, no cause of action.
On the 15th ·day of December, 1952, the plaintiff and
defendant, vvith Mrs. Jaques and Bob Adan1son, were
driving west past the l\Iagna Mill between Magna and
Garfield in Salt Lake County. It was still dark. Defendant was driving and was traveling "not to exceed forty"
miles per hour (R. 80). As they rounded a curve ''the
car started to skid on the ice.'' ( R. 82). ''We slid to our
left." (R. 82). The car recrossed the highway and went
over the edge of a fifteen-foot (15) hank down onto the
railroad tracks ( R. 84). There were icy spots here and
1
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there on the road that morning. (R. 88). When the ear
first left the road, it traveled 90 feet along a hillside son1e
five feet off the road. Then it returned to the highway
and traveled across it so1ne 47 feet and "rent over a cliff.
(R. 93, 94). ''It was foggy that morning." (R. 122).

STATEMENT OF POINT
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF AN EXPERT WITNESS AS TO SPEED OF VEHICLE BASED ON A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION.

ARGUMENT
S. S. Taylor 'vas called as an expert witness in rebuttal to testify as to the sp·eed of the Pontiac car at the
time it started to skid. His qualifications as an expert
were admitte·d (R. 237). He was asked a hypothetical
question based on evidence admitted and in the record
(R. 245, 246). Objection was made and sustained on the
ground that the question was incompetent, irrelevant,
and immaterial, not proper rebuttal, and as not assuming all of the facts of the case. After some clarifying
questions and answers and a further objection, the Court
became very angry and again sustained the objection on
the groun·ds that the witness could not be asked a hypothetical question on facts not in ''this record in the first
place; second place, it isn't rebuttal." (R. 248). The witness 'vas then asked if he had an opinion as to speed,
and objection vvas made. The Court sustained the objection to the question as ""·holly irrelevant." (R. 249).
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It is subn1itted that every fact included in the hypothetical question ha:d been testified to by one or more
\vitnesses and "'ras and is in the record. Besides, the expert \vitness had hilnself viewed the scene at least t\vice
and had made certain measurements and observations.
Under these circumstances, the question was competent,
relevant, and material. An expert witness may be asked
a hypothetical question based partly on personal observation and partly on premises supplied by hypothesis. I I
Wigmore on Evidence Sec. 678. Moreover, a hypothetical
question need not cover all the facts which the questioner
alleges in his case, so long as it includes facts on which
there is or will be admissable evidence. II Wigmore on
Evidence Sec. '682; Travelers Insurance Co. v. Drake
(CCA Cal.) 89 F. 2d 47.
A hypothetical question rnay be fran1ed upon any
theory of interrogator which can reasonably be deduced
from evidence, assumptions may be indulged on any fact
within evidence, and facts not deemed material may be
onritted. See Christiansen v. Hollings (Cal.) 112 P. 2d

723.
Certainly the expert opinion sought by the question
"\\"as not irrelevant. Speed of the vehicle at the point of
skidding was an essential element of the allegations of
negligence. Every witness in the case (except the doctor
and Mr. Adams) had testified as to speed.
In Stamper v. Scholt.:; (Tex.) 29 SW 2d 883 the
Court 'held that ''evidence of experts was perruissible to
show, from the circurnstances detailed to them, as to -vvhat

"'
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the probable speed of the auton1obile
the boy was struck.''

"~a~

at the tinw

Finally, expert opinion as to speed ,,~as proper rebuttal. Plaintiff's witnesses had testified as to speed.
Defendant produced witnesses who testified to a les8er
speed. In rebuttal plaintiff sought to show, through expert opinion based on certain physical factors, that the
speed of the vehicle was greater than testified by defendant's witnesses. The trial court ruled that the evidence
of speed by defendant could not be rebutted.
The erroneous rulings of the trial court excluding
expert testimony on the crucial issue of speed was prejudicial to plaintiff and her cause. The effect "\\ras to
leave before the jury uncontradicted evidence of a lesser
speed than that actually traveled by vehicle at the time
and place in question.

CONCLUSION
The erroneous rulings of the· trial court excluding
the rebuttal testimony of the expert witness prejudiced
the plaintiff in the presentation of her case. The verdict
and judgment should be reversed, and plaintiff should
·he grante·d a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

MOSS & HYDE,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
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